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REPORT 
on the paramountcy of Community law over the laws of Member States 
Rapporteur: Mr. Fernand Dehousse 
Mr. President) 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The recent decision to merge the Executives 
has once again brought to the forefront the need 
to strengthen the powers of the European 
Parliament. 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that 
the present system, whereby what is " lost " by 
the national Parliaments is not " gained " by the 
European Parliament, is indefensible by democra-
tic standards. It is in the legitimate interest of 
the Member States that, as the sphere over 
which the Community has jurisdiction widens its 
bounds, there should be a proportionate increase 
in the degree of control to which it is subject 
and that such control cannot now be other than 
" European ". 
2. Until such time as the outlines of this issue 
become clearer, the European Parliament will of 
course continue to play what has become its tra-
ditional part : that of interpreting and often, 
too, of rousing public opinion in Europe. Hence 
it not only has a right to bring to the attention 
of the public any dangers that it sees as threaten-
ing the Communities or their operation : it also 
has a duty to do so. 
3. Against this background, your Committee 
has sought to determine where Community law 
stands in relation to national law within the 
domestic legal systems of the Member States. It 
has done so because national courts have been 
taking decisions which, to varying degrees, are 
such as to call into question the application of 
Community provisions where they conflitct with 
the domestic law. 
If this trend goes unchecked, your Commit-
tee considers that it could seriously undermine 
the effectiveness of the Communities ; it might 
even go so far as to reduce to nought their raison 
d)etre. 
4. It is quite clear that the Communities will 
be unable to attain the objectives of the Treaties 
if the legal instruments at t)J.eir disposal are not 
enforceable or if the Member States are, to say 
the least, in a position where they can ignore 
them. The European legal order would then be 
liable to disintegrate into a series of incomplete 
systems, independent and divergent as to content. 
5. It would be equally disturbing if the consti-
tutional quality of the treaties were challenged 
by jurisprudence. The Community legal order 
would be seriously shaken and untoward reper-
cussions would undoubtedly follow. 
6. Your Committe is well aware that it is not 
for the European Parliament or for any other 
authority to bring any form of pressure to bear 
on the courts of the Member States. The latter 
must remain quite independent in their judg-
ments. Your Committee considers, however, that 
this does not mean that the Parliament should 
remain silent. It, too, is independent. It, too, has 
its duty. 
Hence the aim of this report is to fire a 
" warning shot " to bring home to the general 
public that there is a Community law which 
every Member State has undertaken to respect. 
Its aim is also to provide the national authorities 
concerned with information likely to ensure the 
balanced development of the Communities, with 
due regard for their rights and duties as well as 
for those of the Member States. 
7. From the legal standpoint, the report will be 
particularly concerned with : 
a) the main theories of jurisprudence on where 
Community law stands in relation to domestic 
law; 
b) the provisions in the constitutions of the 
Member States that deal with the applica-
tion of international treaties within the 
domestic legal context ; 
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c) the main conflicts between national law and 
Community law that have been referred to 
national courts and to the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities. 
8. Let it be emphasized that the concern felt 
by the Legal Committee is shared by Professor 
Hallstein, President of the EEC Commission, who 
stated in the European Parliament on 18 .J:une 
1964 (1) : 
" ... The legal acts of the Community organs 
can be defined, examined as to their validity 
and interpreted only in terms of Community 
law. Assimilating them to categories of 
State legal systems involves the danger of 
misunderstandings and erroneous conclu-
sions. Thus we are obviously led astray if 
regulations of the Community organs are 
designated as derived rules of law applied 
by delegation from the real lawmaker ... 
The rules of Community law come first 
irrespective of the level of the two orders at 
which the conflict occurs. And further, Com-
munity law not only invalidates previous 
national law but also debars subsequent 
national law. Both rules of conflict are part 
of that solidly entrenched body of law ap-
plied in comparable cases. Without them to 
acknowlegde the supremacy of Community 
law would be no more than a courteous 
gesture, carrying no obligations. In reality, 
the Member States could do with it what 
they liked ... 
A unified solution valid for the whole 
Community must be provided for the order 
of precedence here mentioned. Any attempt 
to solve the order of precedence differently 
to accord with the idiosyncrasies of the 
Member States, their constitutions and poli-
tical structure, runs counter to the unifying 
character of European integration, and thus 
to the fundamental principles of our Com-
munity ... " 
9. Your Committee fully endorses the view 
taken by President Hallstein. Indeed, it has 
found that national legal and administrative 
bodies still follow their traditional paths in many 
instances and are rather backward in applying 
Community law. This is mainly due to ignorance 
of the Community regulations and the provisions 
of the European Treaties. More often than not 
the bodies concerned have as yet failed to grasp 
the fundamental importance of Community law 
and its far-reaching implications for the existing 
legal order ; this is due to lack of information 
for which they cannot, in every instance, be held 
responsible. 
(1) See European Parliament ; Verbatim Report No. 72 ; 1964-65 
Session ; sitting of 18 June 1964. · 
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CHAPTER' I 
Legal theory 
A - Standard International Law and 
Community Law 
10. When the Member States ratified the trea-
ties that set up the three European Communities 
and when the texts giving them effect were 
drawn up, this raised the whole problem of the 
co-existence, within the Member States, of two 
systems of law of differing origins : Community 
law and domestic law. The problem arises 
because co-existence naturally means there may 
be conflict, in which case the relevant solution 
has political as well as legal implications. It is 
hardly necessary to repeat that the way in which 
the responsible national authorities interpret and 
apply Community law will in fact have a conside-
rable bearing on the mould and the making of 
Europe. 
In this context jurisprudence and legal theory 
are decisive, in so far as they help to define and 
clarify a political situation. This point was tres-
sed to your Committee on 18 February 1965 by 
the representative of the Legal Department of 
the Communities. Your Rapporteur is of the 
same opinion. 
11. The problem as to where two legal systems 
of differing origin stand in relation to each other 
is not a new one. Ever since the time (i.e. the end 
nineteenth century) when the aims of treaties 
began increasingly to coincide with those of 
laws, this problem has arisen in connexion both 
with the law of nations and domestic law. 
This is why it may be pertinent to recapitu-
late the two main legal theories in this mater. 
The first theory is referred to as the dualist 
theory because its most eminent advocates, such 
as Triepel or Anzilotti, argued that international 
law and domestic law constitute two parallel 
legal systems of differing origin, nature and 
sphere of application. The dualist regard inter-
national law and domestic law as being two inde-
pendent systems of rules. By this they mean 
that the rules deriving from each are only 
enforceable within their own legal order, have 
parallel validity, neither affecting the enforcea-
bility of the other. This parallelism is deemed to 
derive either from an absolute contradistinction 
between the law of nations and domestic law 
with respect both to source, subject and validity, 
or from the distinction between the fundamen-
tal rule of the law of nations - pacta sunt ser-
vanda - and the fundamental rule of domestic 
law, to wit, obedience to the edicts of the State. 
Whatever substantiation is ·offered for this 
parallelism, however, the dualists recognize that 
international law may impose obligations on a 
State and limit its powers, without ever becom-
ing a source or domestic law. What is appli-
cable in the domestic order can never become 
the rule for the law of nations which the State 
is under an international obligation to apply ; 
it can, the dualists consider, only affect the 
measures that the State is required to take to 
fulfil such an obligation ; such measures, effet-
ing the reception of an international rule into 
the domestic legal system, " transform " it into a 
new rule - i.e. domestic rule which is part and 
parcel of domestic law ( 1 ) • 
One criticism that may be levelled here is 
that this theory attaches undue weight to what 
are no more than differences of form or organi-
zation. The sources of international law are no 
doubt technically different from those of domes-
tic law but in actual fact they have one and the 
same origin. 
In opposition to the dualist theory there is 
the monist theory put forward by Kelsen and 
the Austrian jus gentium school and by such 
other eminent jurists as Duguit, Scelle and Ver-
dross. The main basis of the monist theory is 
pure logic. The relationship between internation-
al and domestic law cannot but be that of two 
systems of laws. All laws, however, form a 
pyramid which expresses the hierarchical rela-
tionship between them. This being assumed, it 
is necessary to pinpoint where the rules of inter-
national law fit into this hierarchy and it is here 
that the notion of the paramountcy of the law 
of nations comes into its own in the unitary con-
struction of the universal legal order. 
The basis of this concept may be found in 
the international Community whose existence 
the States must take into account in their rela-
tions with each other. The rule pacta sunt ser-
vanda is therefore primarily a rule at the ser-
vice of the common good reflecting a sense of 
law which is integrated in the bo\ly of laws. 
12. But while the paramountcy of international 
law over domestic law stems essentially from 
the reality of the international Community, the 
question arises whether the law of the European 
Communities can be considered on the same level 
and from the same standpoint of the common 
good. Are there in fact similarities between 
Community law and international law of the 
traditional type which would allow of their being 
assigned the same position in the hierarchy of 
laws? 
(1) Among the many works on this subject see, inter aUa : 
L. Delbez : Les principes generaux du droit international 
public, Paris 1964. See also : F. Dehousse : La ratification 
des traites. Essay on the relationship between treaties and 
domestic law. Paris 1935. 
The representative of the Legal Department 
of the Communities put forward to your Com-
mittee the theory that Community law was of 
a specific kind. 
Until now certain courts have regarded the 
conflict between Community law and national 
law .as being one between traditional internation-
al law and domestic law. The judges have refer-
red to their national constitutions and the means 
open to them under these constitutions to resolve 
any inconsistencies between international trea-
ties and the law. Practical difficulties are, how-
ever, liable to' result because international trea-
ties are introduced into the domestic order by a 
normal act of parliament, whence it could be 
deduced, by virtue of the axiom lex posterior 
derogat priori, that any subsequent law would 
take precedence. If, furthermore, it were conced-
ed that Community law does not differ from 
standard international law, there would be a 
danger of its not being applied in a uniform 
manner, which would be particularly serious 
for the Communities. Indeed, as will be seen in 
the following chapter, certain constitutions in-
clude provisions which can be used as a basis 
for affirming the paramountcy of Community law 
whereas in others there are no such provisions. 
To attempt to resolve the problem of conflicts 
between international and domestic laws is thus 
same means as those used to solve conflicts 
betqeen international and domestic laws is thus 
not what might be described as a perfect 
solution. 
It would, moreover, be more correct and, 
indeed more scientific to seek to justify a given 
solution by reference to the characteristics of 
Community law. The salient feature of the Com-
munity edifice is that it is not, either in its aims 
or in its methods, an international edifice of the 
conventional type. In analyzing Community law 
and, thence, the relationships between it and na-
tional law, lawyers ought not to neglect the impli-
cations of its structure in contrast to standard 
international law. At its origin lie a political 
resolve and a postulation of ultimate objectives 
and these are bound up with the paramountcy 
of Community law ; an adequate solution can 
only derive from concepts that take this origi-
nality to its logical conclusion to justify this 
paramountcy. 
13. This theory was upheld in a resolution pas-
sed at the second international colloquy on Euro-
pean law held in The Hague in October 1963 
under the auspices of the International Federa~ 
tion for European law ; the resolution reads 
inter alia: 
"The problem of the direct enforceability 
of Community regulations in internal juri-
dical systems differs from that of the direct 
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enforceability of prov1s1ons contained in 
international treaties of the traditional 
type in certain specific respects : 
Community regulations have a much 
further-reaching effect on relationships 
of public and private law between per-
sons who come under the jurisdiction of 
the Member States than do the interna-
tional treaties so far concluded ; 
- the direct enforceability of Community 
regulations is ensured not only in the 
national juridical order through its 
courts but also in the Community as a 
result of administrative and legal action 
taken whose effects are felt in the 
national juridical orders : 
- the treaties endow the Communities with 
extensive powers to issue regulations, 
including dis,cretion as to hpw the gener-
al principles they articulate are to be 
implemented." 
14. Your Committee considers, however, that 
there is not sufficient justification of the para-
mountcy of Community law, either in the special 
nature of the legal structure that it has created 
or in the political resolve and postulation of ulti-
mate objectives that are at its root. Indeed, the 
latter obtain at the origin of any rule of law 
whether of the traditional international, Com-
munity or domestic type. To make this the basis 
for the hierarchy of different rules would there-
fore enabb the courts responible for interpret-
ing and applying it to evaluate the relevant 
resolve and finality in the event of any conflict. 
It is therefore not irrelevant to regard Com-
munity law either as a special law setting up a 
special legal order applicable in a Community of 
States or, on the contrary, as an integral part of 
standard international law writ large. 
In support of the latter concept, it can be ar-
gued that the differences between standard inter-
national law and Community law are not the 
same as those between international and domestic 
law. Although Community law has certain defi-
nite characteristi:cs of its own, it has features 
in common with international law. The Euro-
pean Communities. were created by an act of 
international law of the traditional. type. Their 
primary legal basis is an international treaty. 
They are subject to international law in thei.r 
relations with third countries and other inter-
national organizations, etc. 
But while it may readily be conceded that 
the law on whi·ch the European Treaties are 
based comes, under the law of nations, the ques-
tion arises as to what is the nature of the law 
elaborated in putting these Treaties into applica-
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tion through the agency, for instance, of the 
Community institutions. This leads one to 
regard the two laws as foi'ming a whole, in other 
words a law that might be described as "trans-
national " (1) to distinguish it from the law of 
nations as a whole. The law elaborated by the 
Community institutions stems from the direct 
application of the law of the treaties and the 
two categories of rules are ipso facto identical 
in nature. 
If the theory that Community law comes 
under the standard law of nations is accepted, 
its paramountcy over domestic law has likewise 
to be accepted since it is based, like standard 
internationrul law, on the indisputable concept 
of the common good. 
B - Theories on the relationship between 
C01nmunity law and domestic law 
15. This brief introduction to the relationship 
between international law and Community law 
and its implications with regard to the hierarchy 
of Community rules and domestic rules, now 
calls for a survey of some of the theories on the 
relationship between Community law and nation-
al law. 
Acknowledgements are due to Professor Ipsen 
(Western Germany) for having recently made 
a brilliant synthesis of these theories. At the 
second colloquy on European law, arranged• by 
the Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft fiir Europa-
recht and held in Bensheim in July 1964, Profes-
sor Ipsen outlined four main theories (2). 
16. The rudvocates of the first theory argued 
that the relationship between Community and 
national law is based on a. more or less orthodox 
dualist concept. According to this, the Comuni-
ties spr:ang from the conclusion of treaties of 
international law and oblige the States to act in 
a manner consistent with the obligations subs-
cribed to by virtue of these treaties. At the 
Community level, the States are considered to 
have a responsibility towards each other and 
towards the Communities themselves ; domesti-
cally, however, the•re is no automatic para-
mountcy of Community law over national law 
for it is argued that the relationship between 
these ·rules depends on the principles that 
govern, in each State, relations between stand-
ard international law and domestic law. Yet 
since international law becomes effective at the 
domestic level only when it is "received" domes-
(1) See Hans-Jiirgen Schlochauer: Das Verhiiltnis von euro-
paischem zu nationalem Recht in Archiv des V6lkerrechts, 
July 1963. 
(2) See Neue Juristische Wochenschrijt of 20 February and 
27 August 1964; Revue du Marche commun, November 1964. 
tically, it is argued that any subsequent law 
would derogate from the Treaties setting up 
the Communities by virtue of the axiom lex 
posteril>r derogat p?"iorl. There would inevitably 
be divergences between the Member States on 
the way in which the international 'law became 
incorporated in their domestic legal systems. 
There would thus be a kind of " State by State 
assimilation" of the Community law with the 
domestic law and there might also be different 
hierarchies, depending on whether the assimila-
tion was with this or that category of d~estic 
rules. 
17. '!lhe second theory, which concerns proce-
dure, is to a large extent based on the meaning. 
and implications of Article 177 of the EEC 
Treaty. This is in line with the judgment of the 
Court of Justice of 15 July 19641 ) in the case 
Costa versus E.N.E.L. The basis there is a 
pragmatic one : the " effect in practice " of the 
Treaties. 
As opposed to other international treaties, 
the European Treaties and, in this instance, the 
EEC Treaty, have created a specific judicial 
order, which was integrated with the national 
order of the Member States and is binding on 
their courts. In fact, by creating a Community 
of unlimited duration, having its own institu-
tions, its own personality and its own capacity 
in law, apart from having internationrul standing 
and more particularly, real powers resulting 
from a limitation of competence or a transfer 
of powers from the States to the Community, 
the Member States, albeit within limited spheres, 
have restricted their sovereign rights. and crea-
ted a body of law applicable both to their nation-
als and themselves. 
The reception, within the laws of each Mem-
ber State, of provisions having a Community 
source and, more particularly of the terms and 
of the spirit of the Treaty, has as a corollary 
the impossibility, for the Member State, to give 
preference to a unilateral and subsequent meas-
ure against a legal order acc.epted by them on 
a basis of reciprocity. In truth, the executive 
strength of Community laws cannot vary from 
one State to the other in favour of later internal 
laws without endangering the realization of the 
aims envisaged by the EEC Treaty in Article 5,2 
and giving rise to a discrimination prohibited 
by Article 7. In any case, the obligations under-
taken under the 'I1reaty would not be uncondi-
tional, but merely potential if they could be 
affected by subsequent legislative acts of the 
signatories to the Treaty. 
Furthermore, whenever the right to legis-
late unilaterally is allowed to the Member States, 
(1) See Recueil de jurisprudence de Ia Cour, Section 5, Vol X, 
1964. 
it is under a precise and special prov1s1on ; it 
is also true that requests for derogation are sub-
ject to a special procedure of authorization which 
would be meaningless. if the Member States could 
exempt themselves from their obligations by 
means of an ordinary law. 
The pre-eminence of Community law is 
confirmed by Article 189 of the EEC Treaty 
which prescribes that Community regulations 
are " binding in every respect and directly applic-
able in each Member State". Such a provision 
which, it will be noticed, admits of no reserva-
tion, would be wholly ineffective if a Member 
State could unilaterally nullify its purpose. 
It follows from all these observations that 
the rights created by the Treaty, by virtue of 
their specific original nature, cannot be judici-
aJlly contradicted by an internal law, whatever 
it might be, without losing their Community 
character and without undermining the legal 
basis of the Community. The transfer, by Mem-
ber States, from their national order, in favour 
of the Community order of the rights and obliga-
tions arising from the Treaty, carries with it 
a clear limitation of their sovereign right upon 
which a subsequent unilateral law, incompatible 
with the aims of the Community, cannot preva.i'l. 
As a consequence, Article 177 should be applied 
regardless of any national law in those cases 
where a question of interpretation of the Treaty 
·arises. 
18. Professor Ipsen then outlines the third 
theory, that is the federalist theory, according 
to which the question of where Community law 
stands in relation to national! law does not arise, 
because each law covers a different area ; they 
do not overlap. There is the sphere of matters 
that now come under Community jurisdiction and 
that of matters remaining under national juris-
diction. According to this theory, there is no 
possibility of conflict between the two. 
This theory could give rise to a debate on 
the federal nature of the Communities. Your 
Committee does not consider it advisable to enter 
into such a debate in this report, interesting 
though this problem is. 
19. There remain, however, the advocates of 
what is known as the pragmatic theory. 
Although they do not deny the fundamental 
importance of the problem of conflicts between 
national and Community laws, they endeavour 
to minimize it. Where cases of conflict arise, it 
is considered appropriate either to interpret the 
il.aional law in a Community sense or to apply 
the principle in dubio pro Communitate, thus 
creating a kind of irrefragable presumption of 
the superiority of Community law. This is a 
highly simplified approach to settling disputes. 
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C. The main aspects of the problem 
20. While, for the reasons outlined in the first 
part of this report, your Committee is convinced 
of the paramountcy of Community law over the 
domestic laws of the Member States, it has 
endeavoured to show - without taking sides 
with any of the theories so far discussed -
how this paramountcy finds expression in the 
legal structure of the Community. 
Interpenetration of national and Community 
legal systems 
21. The theory that Community and domestic 
rules of law become interwoven is, by definitiqn, 
at the opposite extreme from the dualist theory. 
It implies that the provisions of the Treaties 
become ,directly embodied in the orders of the 
Member States and that they are thus directly 
enforceable without there being any need for 
subsequent " acceptance " provisions in the 
national order.1 ) 
It is agreed that the Treaties that instituted 
the Communities. are also a fundamenal source 
of law for the Communities and, at the same 
time, are part of the internal order of the Mem-
ber States. By virtue of the ratification laws, 
they were, indeed, incorporated in the internal 
legal system in the same way as any national 
law. 
This impli~s : 
a) the absolute identity of the modifications 
made to . the national legal systems of the 
Member States,, given that the same text 
was incorporated in each of the national 
orders.; 
b) the effect of repealing pre-existing national 
laws where these are wholly or partly in-
consistent ·with the terms of the Treaty ; 
c) the power and the duty of the Member 
States to enact the Treaties without there 
being any need for the national parliament 
to intervene. 
(1) This Is the thesis that Catalona defends In the chapter 
entitled .Rapports entre les normes communautaires et les 
orcLres juricLiques des Etats membre~ In his work Manuel 
de droit des Communautes europeennes (Giuffre, Milan, 
1962). While Catalano acknowledges that the dualist 
theory Is acceptable as regards most International Instru-
ments, he stresses that this cannot In any eventually by 
regarded as an absolute rule. He refers to the work by 
·iMorell1 (No~:ioni eLi cLiritto internazionale CEDAM, Padua, 
1963) which, while unreservedly accepting the dualist 
theory, distinguishes between ratification, an act of will 
whereby the State, being subject to International law, 
participates In the creation of the treaty and the act of 
domestic law whereby that law Is modified, as required 
by the new treaty, to conform with the International 
legal order. 
6 
22. The Interpenetration theory is arso based 
on the terms of the Treaty provisions and, in 
particular, on the implications of one of their 
characteristic features-the transfer of powers. 
Indeed, it would be impossible to implement the 
treaties if it were necessary, in order to enforce 
Community regulations, for the constitutional 
bodies of the Member States to incorporate these 
regulations in the national orders. Apart from 
the time lag in enforcing the regulations that 
would inevitably result, the need for a reception 
regulation presupposes that it is within the dis-
cretion of national parliaments to evaluate the 
relevan.ce of the Community regulation. 
One might be tempted of course to justify 
the intervention of the national parliaments by 
arguing that when they authorized the ratifica-
tion of the Treaties, they fully undersood its 
implications and undertook, ipso facto, to pass 
subsequent adjustment regulations. In this sense, 
such regulations would simply be the corollary 
to those in the ratified treaty. Subsequent inter-
ventions by the Parliament would follow as the 
direct result of an undertaking already given 
and the relevant domestic adjustment regulations 
would in practice stand in the same relation to 
the international treaty as implementing regula-
tions in relation to the law. 
Yet the practical implications of Community 
regulations (1), as laid down in the European 
Treaties, appears to be quite different. These 
regulations require that effect be given to the 
very general principles of the Treaties by 
recourse to a choice of means and interventions, 
not determined in a restrictive way, at the 
discretion of the Community institutions upon 
whom the power to issue regulations has been 
conferred. If, under these conditions, the national 
parliaments had to intervene to receive Commu-
nity regulations, they could not be denied the 
discretion to evaluate the choice as to the most 
adequate means to employ to apply the principles 
incorporated in the Treaties. 
To reject the theory of the interpenetration 
of Community and domestic laws and of the 
direct or immediate incorporation of the one in 
the other would. thus be to ignore the implica-
tions of one of the fundamental principles: of the 
Treaties and would be tantamount to precluding 
the enforcement of their main provisions. 
The modification of national constitutions as a 
result of the Treaties 
23. Regulations drawn up by the Community 
institutions to implement the Treaties derive 
from the exercise of the powers which the 
(1) Catalano, op. cit., p. 103 ff. 
Treaties derive from the exercise of the powers 
which the Treaties conferred upon them. In law, 
the immediate incorporation of these regulations 
is the corollary of a modification to the national 
constitutional systems resulting from the Treat-
ies. In this sense, endowing the Community 
institutions with the power to issue regulations 
may be regarded as a new source from which 
regulations may emanate, supplementing the 
sources for which provision is made in the 
constitutions of the Member States (1-). 
24. Mutatis mutandis, the same line of reasoning 
must be followed with regard to the indirect 
power to issue regulations conferred on the three 
Communities. Community recommendations or 
directives constitute an indirect source of national 
measures which the Member States are under an 
obligation to take in order to comply with them. 
When powers were conferred on the Com-
munities this involved a substantial transfer of 
prerogatives from the internal constitutional 
institutions to the Community bodies. This had 
its effect on the national orders in that it 
subordinated them to the Community order. 
Non-abrogation of Treaty regulations as a result 
of subsequent national laws 
25. It is along these lines that another problem 
will have to be solved, that of any inconsistencies 
that may arise between the terms the European 
Treaties and new regulations passed by the 
Member States subsequent to the ratification of 
the Treaties. Recourse cannot be had to the 
principle of implicit abrogation in this instance. 
This is a principle which is valid in relation to 
regulations enacted prior to the promulgation of 
the act of ratification but which cannot, by 
definition, be applied with respect to subsequent 
regulations. 
Can such regulations, passed in the manner 
required by the constitution, implicitly repeal in 
the internal order regulations which are contained 
in the Treaties and which have been incorporated 
in the internal order as a result of the ratific-
ation laws ? In other words, does the principle 
lex posterior derogat priori apply both to the 
provisions of the Treaties in their effect on 
existing laws and to new regulations in their 
effect on provisions of the three Treaties ? 
This solution must be rejected for it is 
certain that in subscribing to the fundamental 
provisions of Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty, 
(1) Catalano defends this thesis ; Perassl does also In his work 
Lezioni di diritto internazionale (CEDAM, Padua, 1953). 
Perassl considers that the rule Incorporated In the Treaties 
that set up the Communities acts as a " ceaseless modifier " 
of national orders which become either amended or amplified 
by Community regulations. 
Article 5 of the EEC Treaty and Article 192 of 
we Euratom Treaty (1), the Member States 
undertook not only to take all measures, whether 
general or particular, appropriate to ensure the 
carrying out of the obligations arising out of the 
treaties and to provide the Communities with 
every facility for performing their tasks but 
also to abstain from any measures which could 
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the 
treaties. The provisions in the treaties which 
impose commitments on the Member States or 
which entail a transfer of powers to the Com-
munities may be regarded as having a similar 
effect. 
Consequently, if any Member State were, 
after ratifying the three treaties, to take any 
measure inconsistent with the treaties, this would 
represent . a failure to meet contractual obliga-
tions. In that eventuality, the g,ystem of guar-
antees incorporated in the institutional machin-
ery of the Communities would come into force. 
The matter could be referred to the Court of 
Justice and the Court's decision, upon finding 
that an infringement had occurred, would oblige 
the State concerned to repeal the new measures 
that were inconsistent with the terms of the 
treaties. 
Non-abrogation, as a result of subsequent nation-
al laws, of Community regulations on the 
implementation of the Treaties 
26. It is worth remembering that the provisions 
of the Treaties setting up the Communities are 
not the only ones to have a normative effect in 
the Communities. Regulations issued by the 
Community institutions have the same normative 
effect. In the event of a clash between these 
regulations and those of the internal order, the 
former take precedence. This is because, on the 
one hand, Community regulations follow from 
the exercise of the powers transferred from the 
Member States to the Community and, on the 
other, from the terms of Articles 86 of the ECSC 
Treaty, 5 of the EEC Treaty and 192 of the 
EAEC Treaty quoted above whereby States 
undertook to take all measures, whether general 
or particular appropriate to ensure the carrying 
out of their obligations... and to assist the 
Community in the achievement of its tasks. 
(1) Article 86 EC'SC : " Member States undertake that they 
will take all steps, both general or particular, needed to 
discharge their obligations resulting from decisions and 
recommendations by the Community's Institutions and that 
they will help the Community to carry out Its duties. " 
Article 5 EEC : " Member States shall take all measures, 
whether general or particular, appropriate to ensure the 
carrying out of the obllgaations arising out of this Treaty 
or resulting from the acts of the Institutions of the 
Community. They shall assist the' latter In the achievement 
of Its tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measures which could jeo-
pardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty. " 
(The text of Article 192 of the Euratom Treaty Is the 
same as that of Article 5 of the EEC Treaty). 
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It must be stressed, however, that the provi-
sions of the Treaties are atomatically applicable 
able ; it is only as regards their interpretation 
that any problem may arise ; regulations issued 
by the institutions, on the other hand, may be 
appealed against in the Court of Justice which 
may quash them. Thus the paramountcy of 
regulations issued by the institutions over 
internal regulations is subject either to no appeal 
being made or the appeal's rejection if it should 
be made. 
27. With regard to domestic regulations and 
those issued by the Community institutions in 
discharging their responsibilities, the question 
of their respective pre-eminence in the event of 
any conflict has yet to be determined. The regula-
tions issued by the Communities (i.e. general 
decisions of the High Authority, regulations of 
the Councils and the Commissions), have the 
force of law within the Community legal system 
even though their adoption still fails to comply 
with the traditional rules of parliamentary 
legislation. As a result of the transfer of powers 
that took place when the Communities were 
created, the Member States may neither legislate 
nor take implementing measures in a sphere 
where the Community authorities have sole juris-
diction. 
28. Consequently, domestic measures that 
conflict with the power of the Communities to 
issue regulations would be deemed to have been 
passed by authorities that are not competent to 
do so. Indeed, this incompetence could be the 
subject of an infringement procedure (Article 169 
of the EEC Treaty) following which the Court 
of Justice might decide that a Member State had 
failed to fulfil its obligations. Yet the division 
of competence resulting from the Treaties would 
become meaningless and would cease, in the 
majority of cases at least, to have any practical 
effect if a national judge, in a dispute over 
conflicting Community and national regulations 
were neither able nor obliged to recognize the 
paramountcy of the Community regulations, 
bearing in mind that the national authority 
would not be competent in such an instance. 
This power to sanction the paramountcy of Com-
munity law is furthermore expressly assigned to 
the national courts which retain the right to 
settle the dispute by referring it to the Court of 
Justice of the Communities for a preliminary 
ruling. (Article 177 of the EEC Treaty). 
The principles outlined here have been 
confirmed by the Court of Justice on several 
occasions, notably in its ruling COSTA/ENEL 
of 15 July 1964 (1). 
(1) See above, paragraph 17. 
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Domestic regulations issued by the Member 
States to fulfil obligations resulting from the 
treaties or to comply with recommendations, 
directives or decisions from the three Communi-
ties, raise a similar problem : i.e. as regards their 
compatibility with other domestic regulations .. 
This problem will have to be resolved by refer-
ence to the system of guarantees laid down in 
the treaties. Should the case arise, it will be for 
the Court to decide whether or not the new 
domestic regulations constitute a breach of the 
obligations of the treaties and to give an 
appropriate ruling. 
CHAPTER II 
Constitutions of the Member States 
29. One conclusion emerges, among many others, 
from the foregoing : the solution to the problem 
of the paramountcy of Community law over the 
laws of the Member States cannot be allowed 
to vary according to the case or the Member 
States involved. It must be the same for the 
whole Community. 
30. Hence it would appear pertinent to examine 
the sections of the constitutions of the Member 
States that govern the relationships between 
Community law or international law and 
domestic law. These relationships are not settled 
in an identical manner nor even, at times, in a 
very clear way. 
a) Federal Republic of Germany 
31. Article 25 of the Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany reads as follows (1) : 
" The general rules of public international 
law are an integral part of federal law. They 
shall take precedence over the laws and shall 
directly create rights and duties for the 
inhabitants of the federal territory". 
Similarly, Article 24,1 of the Basic Law 
reads: 
" The Federation may, by legislation, trans-
fer sovereign powers to inter-governmental 
institutions. " 
32. At first sight, these provisiOns appear to 
confirm, with abundant clarity, the principle of 
(1) Constitutional texts prior to 1951 quoted hl!l"eafter are from 
the work on Lea Cr>nstitutions europeennes by Boris 
Mirkine-Guetzvitch, Paris, 1951. 
Texts after 1951 were translated by the Secretariat of the 
European Parliament. 
the paramountcy of Community law over the 
national law in the Federal Republic. Yet the 
Basic Law provides that in the event of any 
conflict, the Federal Constitutional Court shall 
intervene, as laid down in Article 100, 2 : 
" If, in the course of litigation, doubt exists 
whether a rule of public international law is 
an integral part of federal law and whether 
such rule directly creates rights and duties 
for the individual (Article 25), the court 
shall obtain the decision of the Federal 
Constitutional Court. " 
33. It has been asked whether international 
treaties such as the Paris and Rome Treaties 
constitute " general " rules of public international 
law and whether the Constitution ensures the 
paramountcy of the rules laid down by an interna-
tional treaty · over domestic law through the 
exercise of judicial control. 
As will be seen in Chapter III, the German 
courts have to date given divergent answers (1). 
34. Certain German courts have expressed doubts 
as to the paramountcy of Community law, taking 
as their basis various articles of the Constitution: 
Article 80,1, reads : 
"The Federal Government, a Federal Minister 
or the Land Government may be authorised 
by a law to issue ordinances having the 
force of law (Rechtsverordnungen). The 
content, purpose and scope of the powers 
conferred must be set forth in the law. The 
legal basis must be stated in the ordinance. 
If a law provides that a power may be 
further delegated, an ordinance having the 
force of law shall be necessary in order to 
delegate the power. " 
Article 129,1 and 3, reads : 
"In so far as legal provisions which con-
tinue in force .as federal iaw contain an 
authorization to issue ordinances having the 
force of law (Rechtsverordnungen) or 
general administrative rules or to perform 
administrative acts, the authorization shall 
pass to the agencies henceforth competent 
in the matter. In cases of doubt, the Federal 
Government shall decide in agreement with 
the Bundesrat ; the decision must be 
published." 
" In so far as legal provisions within the 
meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2 authorize 
their .amendment or supplementation or the 
issue of legal provisions instead of laws, 
these authorizations have expired." 
(1) See below, paragraphs 70 to 80. 
35. Other articles also have to be mentioned : 
Article 20 reads : 
" The Federal Republic of Germany is a 
democratic and social federal state. 
All state authority emanates from the people. 
It shall be exercised by the people by means 
of elections and voting and by separate 
legislative, executive and judicial organs. 
Legislation shall he subject to the constitu-
tional order ; the executive and the judiciary 
shall be bound by the law. " 
Article 79,3 reads : 
"Any .amendment of this Basic Law affect-
ing the division of the Federation into 
Laender, the participation in principle of the 
Laender in legislation, or the basic principles 
laid down in Articles 1 and 20, shall be 
inadmissible. " 
Article 1 reads : 
" The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect 
and protect it shall be the duty of all state 
authority. 
" The German people therefore acknowledges 
inviolable and inalienable human rights as 
the basis of every community, of peace and 
of justice in the world. 
" The following basic rights shall bind the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary 
as directly enforceable law." 
36. As will be seen in Chapter III, a number of 
regulations introducing levies on several agricul-
tural products and the national Iaws relating 
thereto are liable, in Germany, to be regarded as 
incompatible with the financial regulations of the 
Basic Law and, in particular with Articles 105,1 
and 2 ; 106,1 and 108,1 and 2 (1). 
The regulations read as follows : 
Article 105,1 and 2 : 
"The Federation shall have the exclusive 
power to legislate on customs matters and 
fiscal monopolies. 
" The Federation shall have concurrent 
power to legislate on : 
1. excise taxes and taxes on transport, 
motor-vehicles, and transactions (Verkehr-
steuern), with the exception of taxes with 
localized application, in particular of real 
estate acquisition tax, increment value tax, 
and fire protection tax ; 
(1) See below, paragraphs 70 to 80. 
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2. taxes on income, on property, on inherit-
ances, and on donations ; 
3. taxes on real estate and business (Realst-
euern), with the exception of the fixing of 
the tax rates, if it claims the taxes in whole 
or in part to cover federal expenditure or 
if the conditions laid down in Article 72, 
paragraph 2 (1 ) exist. " 
Article 106,1 : 
" The yield of fiscal monopolies and receipts 
from the following taxes shall accrue to the 
Federation : 
1. customs duties, 
2. such excise taxes as do not accrue to the 
Laender in accordance with paragraph 2, 
3. turnover tax, 
4. transportation tax, 
5. non-recurrent levies on property, and 
equalization taxes imposed for the purpose 
of implementing the Equalization of Burdens 
legislation, 
6. Berlin emergency aid tax, 
7. income and corporation surtaxes. " 
Article 108,1 : 
" Customs duties, fiscal monopolies, excise 
taxes subject to concurrent legislative 
powers, transportation tax, turnover tax, and 
non-recurrent levies on property shall be 
administered by federal revenue authorities. 
The organization of these authorities and 
the procedure to be applied by them shall 
be regulated by federal law. The heads of 
the authorities at intermediate level shall 
be appointed after consultation of the Land 
Governments. The Federation may transfer 
the administration of non-recurrent levies on 
property to the Land revenue authorities as 
its agents. " 
b) Italy 
37. Article 10,1 of the Italian Constitution reads: 
" The Italian juridical system conforms to 
(1) Article 72, 2 lays down that on matters within the con-
current legislative powers : "The Federation shall have 
the right to legislative on these matters to the extent that 
a need for regulation by federal law exists because 
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1. a matter cannot be effectively regulated by the legis-
lation of individual Laender, or ... 
2. the regulation of a matter by a Land law might 
prejudice the interests of other Laender or of the entire 
community, or 
3. the maintenance of legal or economic unity, especially 
the maintenance of a uniformity of living conditions 
beyond the territory of a Land, necessitates such 
regulation. " 
the generally recognized principles of inter-
national law. " 
Article 11 reads : 
" Italy renounces war as an instrument of 
offense to the liberty of other peoples or as 
a means of settlement of international 
disputes, and, on conditions of equality with 
the other states, agrees to the limitations 
of her sovereignty necessary to an organiza-
tion which will assure peace and justice 
among nations, and promotes and encourages 
international organizations constituted for 
this purpose. " 
38. The formulation of this article would appear 
to be clear. Provision is made for the State to 
renounce part of its sovereignty in the interests 
of specific objectives. This is what Italy did in 
ratifying the European treaties. Indeed, the 
structure created by the latter involves a whole 
legal order that transcends the States which form 
the basis of the Communities, to affirm itself in 
an original and new context that is very much 
akin to the structure of a federation. 
39. Who will deny, for instance, that the right 
of the Communities to legislate has been 
recognized in the same way as that of federal 
institutions would be ? Suffice it to recall the 
power of the institutions to issue binding regula-
tions that are " fdly and directly applicable in 
each Member State ". The Member States', fur-
thermore, undertook to apply certain Community 
decisions, even against their own will. This is the 
case for decisions taken by a majority on the 
Council. 
Thus one of the most common expressions 
of sovereignty, namely the power to legislate 
within the framework of the provisions of the 
treaties, is to be found within the communities. 
Hence the question : does not the legal pattern 
of the European treaties approximate more 
closely to that of a constitution than to that of 
an international treaty ? This question arises not 
only with reference to the Italian Constitution. 
It was thoroughly dealt with in President 
Hallstein's speech to the European Parliament on 
18 June 1964. His reply, of course, was in the 
affirmative. 
c) France 
40. Since the second world war, the principle of 
the paramountcy of international law over 
national law has become constitutionally accept-
ed in the French Republic. 
Article 26 of the Constitution of 27 October 
1946 reads: 
" Diplomatic treaties duly ratified and 
published shall have the force of law even 
when they are contrary to internal French 
legislation ; they shall require for their 
application no legislative acts other than 
those necessary to ensure their ratification." 
41. To this was added the first sentence of 
Article 28 which reads : 
"Since diplomatic treaties duly ratified and 
published have authority superior to that of 
French internal legislation, their provisions 
shall not be abrogated, modified, or suspend-
ed without previous formal denunciation 
through diplomatic channels. " 
42. These texts were replaced by Articles 54 and 
55 of the Constitution of 4 October 1958 which 
reads: 
Article 54 : 
" If the Constitutional Council declared that 
an international undertaking, laid before it 
by the President of the Republic, the Prime 
Minister or the President of either Assembly, 
contains a clause that is at variance with the 
Constitution, its ratification or approval can-
not be authorized until the Constitution has 
been revised. " 
Article 55 : 
"Treaties or agreements that have been duly 
ratified or approved have, upon publication, 
a higher authority than ordinary laws sub-
ject, in the case of every treaty or agree-
ment, to its being applied by the other 
party." 
43. Despite the apparent clarity of these pro-
visions, a controversy has arisen as to their 
interpretation. The paramountcy of international 
treaties over national laws has of course been 
acknowledged. This paramountcy, no doubt 
means, that, for as long as a treaty remains in 
force, any existing laws at variance with the 
treaty will be null and void, but question arises 
as to the exact legal status of a subsequent law 
that runs counter to a treaty in force. The new 
provision would prohibit the legislator from 
enacting such a law. Assuming he disregarded 
this, what sanction would follow ? Is the judge 
empowered to refuse to apply the law ? In other 
words, if one of the requirements of the Consti-
tution is violated, is this, followed by a judicial 
sanction or not ? 
44. Opinions differ on this point (1). Certain 
writers take the view that the texts do not 
empower the court to censure a legislator enact-
ing a law at variance with a treaty in force. 
Others, on the other hand, stress that if a judge 
were obliged to apply a law at variance with a 
treaty concluded at an earlier date, this would 
mean disregarding the constitutional provisions 
concerned or to make them null and void in 
practice. The courts of appeal have concurred in 
this interpretation. 
d) Belgium 
45. The Belgian Constitution contains no provi-
sions on the relationship between international 
and domestic law. In contrast to previous ones 
mentioned, the Belgian Constitution is of fairly 
long standing ; it was drawn up at a time when 
the problem did not arise. It has, however, 
recently been decided to revise it and this is the 
direction that will probably be followed when 
Articles 68 and 107 are re-examined. 
46. In the meantime, there are no provisions in 
the Belgian Constitution which explicitly or 
implicitly prohibit the legislator from passing 
a law at variance with an international treaty 
concluded at an earlier date. The Belgian Consti-
tution does not empower the legislator to inter-
pret an international treaty through the medium 
of a statutory order. Indeed, Article 68,1 reads : 
" The King commands the forces both by 
land and sea, declares war,. makes treaties 
of peace, of alliance, and of commerce. He 
shall inform the two Houses of these acts 
as soon as the interests and safety of the 
State permit, adding thereto suitable com-
ments." 
An international treaty does not therefore 
fall within the competence of the legislative 
power ; the latter does not conclude treaties and 
cannot denounce them. 
47. This lacuna in the Belgian Constitution has 
not escaped the attention of Parliament. In 1953, 
on the occasion of an intended revision of certain 
articles, the Special Committee of the Chamber 
was seised of a proposal to supplement Article 
107 by a provision stipulating that the courts 
have no right to apply domestic laws that are at 
variance with international treaties. This pro-
posal was rejected on the grounds that although 
(1) See Hayoit de Termicourt : Speech made on 2 September 1963 
at the re-opening of the Supreme Court of Appeal of 
Belgium (Journal des tribunaux, 15 September 1963). 
Mr. Hayoit de Termicourt quoted the main theses maintain-
ed by French lawyers (see below paragraph 9()) and in 
particular N!boyet (Dalloz - chronique XXIII, 1946, Donne-
dieu de Vabres (Dalloz - chronique II, 1948), Rousseau 
(Droit international public, Precis Dalloz, 1961). 
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treaties or agreements, duly approved and pu-
blished, take precedence over existing national 
law, the courts have no right to refuse to give 
effect to a national law subsequent to an inter-
national treaty since this would be trespassing 
on the jurisdiction of the legislative and executive 
authorities. 
48. A similar amendment was submitted in 1959 
when a second attempt was made to carry 
through a revision of the Constitution. This 
concerned Article 68. The responsible committee 
rejected this too, but for different reasons. It 
preferred to rely on the evolution of inter-
national public law and jurisprudence for the 
solution of this problem which it felt had not yet 
been settled in a uniform manner. 
49. In view of the ever-increasing importance in 
practical terms of the Treaties of Paris and 
Rome, of developments in the spheres they 
embrace and the difficulty of the legislator in 
uncovering inconsistencies between a new law 
and the treaties in force, it has not taken long 
for the problem to reappear. It is on the agenda 
for a forthcoming constituent session of the 
the Chamber (that to be returned on 23 May 
1965). 
e) Luxembourg 
50. Article 49 of the Luxembourg Constitution 
is restricted to the following provision : 
" The exercise of powers vested, under the 
Constitution, in legislative, executive and 
judicial authorities may temporarily be 
transferred by treaty to institutions of pub-
lic international law. " 
There are no other texts by reference to 
which the problem under discussion may be 
solved. 
51. In a judgment delivered in 1954, however, 
(see Chapter III) (1), the Higher Court of 
Justice of the Grand Duchy decided that a judge 
must apply an· international treaty in force even 
if it is at variance with a subsequent law. 
f) Netherlands 
52. The Netherlands is the only Member State 
to have resolved in a satisfactory manner the 
problem of the legal implications of a inter-
national treaty in relation to national law ; it did 
this by amending the Constitution in 1953 and 
1956. 
(1) See below, paragraphs 91 and 92. 
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53. Article 60,3 reads : 
" The judge shall not be competent to judge 
of the constitutionality of international 
treaties." 
Similarly, Article 131,2 lays down that : 
"The laws are inviolable. " 
In other words, it is not within the compet-
ence of a Dutch judge to give a ruling on the 
constitutionality of international treaties or laws. 
These Articles have, however, to be read in 
conjunction with Articles 65,1, 66 and 67,2. 
Article 65,1 reads : 
" Rules with regard to the publication of 
agreements shall be laid down in the law. 
Agreements shall be binding on any one in 
so far as they will have been published. " 
Article 66 reads : 
" The legal provisions in force within the 
Kingdom shall not apply if the application 
should be incompatible with agreements 
which have been published, either before or 
after the enactment of the provisions. " 
Article 67,2 reads : 
" By or in virtue of an agreement, certain 
powers with respect to legislation, admin-
istration and jurisdiction may be conferred 
on organisations based on international law." 
54. The principle of the paramountcy of treaties 
over laws is thus guaranteed by the Dutch Cons-
titution. 
This also provides for the contingency of 
inconsistencies between a treaty and the Consti-
tution itself. Indeed, Article 63 reads : 
" If the development of the international 
legal order required this, the contents of an 
agreement may deviate from certain pro-
visions of the Constitution. In such cases 
the approval of the agreement shall not be 
given by the States-General but with a two-
thirds majority of the votes cast in each of 
the two Chambers. " 
55. This review of the relevant provisions in the 
Constitutions of the Member States shows that 
the extension to Community law of the traditio-
nal rules relating to the reception of internatio-
nal law would be at variance with the purpose 
and objectives of the Communities. If any Mem- · 
her State were able itself to decide as to the 
effect of Community law within its territory, 
the legal order in the making would disintegrate ; 
it would give way, as in the past, to as many 
legal systems as -there were Member States. 
This is already generally recognized as being 
true ; it is none the less worth repeating. 
56. There would similarly be no legal foundation 
for applying the rules of reception of internatio~ 
nal law to Community law for the latter does not 
spring from international public law ; it is com~ 
posed of provisions which, in the relevant sphe~ 
res, give the Community its own special cha~ 
racter. 
Community law, furthermore, constitutes an 
independent and exclusive legal order having its 
own institutions. The law of the European Com~ 
munities is, therefore, the independent law of 
three Communities of States until such time as it 
becomes the law of an integrated Community. 
51. No State can alter the specific nature of 
Community law which lies in the fact that it is 
applied fully and uniformly throughout the Com~ 
munities. Any unilateral amendment of Commu-
nity law by a Member State would violate the 
general principle of equality and be a negation 
of the system. 
The principle lex posterior derogat priori 
can not be applied to relationships between 
Community and national law but only to provi-
sions of the same order having the same origin. 
Hence Community law derogates not only from 
earlier national laws ; it also precludes subse~ 
quent laws. 
58. Seen in this light, Community law differs 
from international law. 
This does not mean - and we wish to make 
it quite clear - that your Committee connects 
the former with a dualist construction of its 
relations with domestic law, and that it accepts 
for domestic law that which it rejects for Com~ 
munity law i. e. the corollary of reception with 
all its legal implications. A development is un-
doubtedly in progress which will in turn lead to 
the complete paramountcy of international law 
and there are very good reasons for this. One 
of these is is that international law is not fully 
self~executing and ceases to obtain once the 
validity of a subsequent law is acknowledged. 
What purpose, indeed, would it serve to conclude 
treaties which could validly be derogated from in 
the internal order. Naturally, the international 
responsibilities of the State are involved in such 
instances but the end in view in contempora-
neous treaties is different again ; it is, in most 
instances, to make them applicable within the 
territory of the contracting parties. 
However, it has to be recognized that the 
dualist theory remains a strong one, stronger in 
fact than was thought when opposition to this 
theory first arose ... It continues to win substan-
tial support. It is above all rooted in the ideas 
and traditions of national jurisprudence. The 
ever~increasing number of treaty~laws is causing 
it to lose ground and it will continue to do so to 
an increasing extent. It is clear, however, that 
the, imperatives of the Communities are even 
more pressing, and it is much harder for the 
States to evade them if they do not wish to 
ruin their work. Thus, dualism is not simply a 
kind of growing pain ; it is a deadly danger. 
This is all that this chapter set out to 
demonstrate. 
CHAPTER ill 
The main disputes at law 
59. It has been primarily in Italy and in Ger-
many that disputes at law have occurred with 
reference to the application of Community law. 
Italy 
60. The most notable dispute to arise in Italy 
concerned the nationalization of electricity. 
The Constitutional Court was seised of a 
dispute as to whether the law creating the ENEL 
(Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica) was consis-
tent with the EEC Treaty. The Court recognized 
that the conclusion of Treaties limiting sove-
reignty was lawful and that it was permissible 
to apply them on the basis of a normal law pro-
vided certain conditions were fulfilled. It did, 
however, express the opinion that Article 11 of 
the Constitution did not confer any special or 
privileged status upon the law ratifying the 
Treaty. 
It is to be noted, however, that the Court 
expressed this opinion only in its statement of 
reasons for its conclusions ; it did not pronounce 
on the paramountcy of Community law. 
61. The interpretation of the Court would ap-
pear to be open to discussion. Indeed, the law 
ratifying the European Treaties is based on the 
Constitution itself. Without a constitutional 
authorization, the Parliament would have been 
unable to pass such laws. These, therefore, are 
not ordinary laws, subject to repeal by subse-
quent acts. 
62. It follows that the Treaties ratified under 
Article 11 of the Constitution restrict the powers 
of the Parliament itself and that if the Parlia-
ment passes laws at variance with the Treaties, 
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it is usurping the legislative power. Such laws, 
indeed, go against Article 11. 
63. The Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities adopted the same line of reasoning in 
its judgment of 15 July 1964.1 ) 
This judgment was delivered at the request 
of the " Giudice Conciliatore " of Milan which 
had, on the basis of Article 177 of the EEC 
treaty, referred the question to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling. 
6-i. The Italian Government, which appeared 
before the Court as defendant, alleged the abso-
lute inadmissibility of the request for a prelimin-
ary ruling since national courts had to apply 
domestic law and could not, for that reason, 
have recourse to Article 177. 
The Court of Justice rejected the plea of 
inadmissibility. The reasons why this plea was 
rejected are worth quoting in full, given their 
implications and the importance of the principles 
involved: 2 ) 
"As opposed to other international treaties, 
the Treaty instituting the EEC has created 
its own order which was integrated with the 
national order of the Member States when 
the Treaty came into force ; as such, it is 
binding upon them. 
In fact, by creating a Community of 
unlimited duration, having its own insti-
tutions, its own personality and its own 
capacity in law, apart from having inter-
national standing and more particularly, 
real powers resulting from a limitation of 
competence or a transfer of powers from 
the States to the Community, the Member 
States, albeit within limited spheres, have 
restricted their sovereign rights and created 
a body of law applicable both to their 
nationals and to themselves. 
The reception, within the laws of each 
Member State, of provisions having a Com-
munity source, and more particularly of the 
terms and of the spirit of the Treaty, has 
as a corollary the impossibility, for the 
Member State, to give preference to a uni-
lateral and subsequent measure against a 
legal order accepted by them on a basis of 
reciprocity. 
In truth, the executive strength of Com-
munity laws cannot vary from one State to the 
other as a result of later internal laws without 
endangering the realization of the aims envisaged 
(1) See above, paragraphs 17 and 28. 
(2) Recueil de Ia jurisprudence de Ia Cour fasclcule No 5 Vol 
X, 1964. '. . ' . 
by the Treaty in Article 5(2) and giving rise to 
a discrimination prohibited by Article 7. 
In any case, the obligations entered into 
under the Treaty creating the European Com-
munity would not be unconditional, but merely 
potential if they could be affected by subsequent 
legislave acts of the signatories to the Treaty. 
Furthermore, whenever the right to legis-
late unilaterally is allowed to the Member States 
it is under a precise and special provision (see' 
for instance, Article 15, 93 (3), 223, 224 to 225): 
It is also true that requests for derogation 
by Member States are subject to a special pro-
cedure of authorization (ArticleS (4),17 (4),25, 
26, 73, 93 (3) and 226) which would be meaning-
less if the Member States could evade their obli-
gations by means of an ordinary Law. 
The pre-eminence of Community law is con-
firmed by Article 189 which lays down that 
Community regulations are binding and" directly 
applicable within each Member State". Such a 
provision which admits of no reservation, would 
be wholly ineffective if a Member State could 
unilaterally nullify its purpose by means of a 
law contrary to Community law. It follows from 
all these observations that the law created by 
the Treaty, by virtue of its independent source 
and its specific original nature, cannot be judi-
cially contradicted by an internal law whatever 
it might be, without losing its Comm'unity cha-
racter and without undermining the legal basis 
of the Community. 
The transfer by Member States from their 
national order to the Community order, of rights 
and obligations arising from the Treaty, entails 
a defini~e limitation of their sovereign rights, 
upon W~ICh a sub~equent unilateral law, incompa-
tible With the mms of the Community, cannot 
prevail. 
" As consequence, Article 177 should be 
applied regardless of any national law in 
those cases where a question of interpreta-
tion of the Treaty arises. " 
65: In June 1964 the Courts of Naples, Rome, 
Milan and Mondovi (1) tok a slightly different 
attitude from that of the Italian Constitutional 
Court. 
These courts had been seised by several 
enterprises of an appeal for stay of execution 
of a High Authority decision that the Court of 
Justice, in its judgment of 17 December 1963 (2) 
had recognized as legal. The plaintiffs submitted 
in particular that the procedure followed with 
(1) Rivista di Diritto internazionale privata e processuale 
CEDAM - March 1965, pp. 110-125. . 
(2) Recueil dtl Ia jurisprudence de Ia Cour, atfaires jointes 
Nos. 2 to 10-63 - Vol. IX, 1963. ' 
regard to the law ratifying the Treaty should 
have been that laid down for giving effect to 
constitutional laws and not that for passing ordi-
nary laws. The courts replied that provision was 
made in Article 11 of the Italian Constitution 
for Parliament to pass an ordinary law to ratify 
a treaty that limited the sovereignty of the Ita-
lian Republic. None the less, they recognized 
that, as a result of this procedure, the treaty 
had become an ordinary law within the Italian 
domestic legal system. 
These judgments follow the same lines as 
the arguments developed above in regarding 
Article 11 of the Italian Constitution as the basis 
for the Parliament's authority to ratify the 
European Treaties ; where they differ from 
them is in conceding that the law ratifying the 
European Treaties should be regarded as an 
ordinary law. 
66. The judgment of the Court of Turin of 
11 December 1964 is a:lso re,levant here (1). 
The problems are more or less the same. The 
plaintiff - the Italian steel company Acciaierie 
San Michele - applealed against a fine imposed 
by the High Authority because it had refused to 
comply with a request to forward the invoices 
relating to its electricity consumption during the 
period 1 April 1954 to 10 November 1958. Inter 
alia, the plaintiff asked that the matter be refer-
red to the Constitutional Court. It submitted that 
the ECSC Treaty had become incorporated in 
the Italian legal system as a result of an ordi-
nary law and not in compliance with the special 
procedure laid down. in Article 138 of the Con-
stitution. Was this not a breach of the latter ? 
67. The Court agreed to refer the case to the 
Constitutional Court. It considered that the sub-
mission as to unconstitutionality was clearly not 
without grounds, because as a result of the ECSC 
Treaty, the judicial function was no longer 
exercised by ordinary judges in accordance with 
Article 102 of the Constitution, but by the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities. 
The Turin Court also accepted that the ques-
tion of unconstitutionality was, not wholly un-
founded with respect to the provisions of Arti-
cle 113 of the Constitution which provides for 
" judicial protection ... against acts of the public 
administration ... before the organs of ordinary 
and administrative jurisdiction." 
(1) Court of Turin, 21 December 1964 : Ordinanza in Foro 
Padano, January 1965, fourth part. 
In a judgment of the Court of Turin on 10 May 1963 
furthermore (see Giurisprudenza italiana 1964 - ,I, Part I, 
section two) we read : 
" that the ECSC once constituted through a ratification of 
the Treaty became sovereign and independent in accordance 
with that Treaty. It has therefore exercised a legislative 
executive and judicial activity in its <>wn right quite 
independently of those that the Member States are empower-
ed to exercise within their territories in pursuance of 
their various constitutions. " 
Yet under Article 33,2 of the ECSC Treaty, 
the competence of the Court of Justice only 
covers cases of misuse of powers. There is thus 
no protection in the event of any other act. 
68. The doubt expressed by the Court of Turin 
would appear to be unacceptable. A cession of 
sovereignty, such as provided for under Arti-
cle 11 of the Constitution, must necessarily entail 
a change in the constitutional structure of the 
State. Had the cession of sovereignty not been 
expressly permitted, recourse should have been 
had to the procedure laid down in Article 138. 
But since the Constitution did this, it was clearly 
implied that any legal order had automatically 
to be modified when Article 11 was put into 
application. 
The Italian legal system, including Arti-
cle 102 and 113 of the Constitution, will in future 
have to be considered in the light of this reality. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
69. As stated in Chapter II (1), Article 24 of 
the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Ger-
many lays down that the Federation may, by 
legislation, transfer sovereign powers to inter-
governmental institutions. This definition is 
quite clear as regards the transfer of sovereign 
powers, less so as regards the phrase " to inter-
governmental institutions". What kind of insti-
tutions are involved : federal, Community or in-
ternational institutions proper ? 
In any event, the Basic Law accepts the 
principle of a limitation of sovereignty ; conse-
quently, the Parliament was not acting ultra 
vires in ratifying the European Treaties. 
70. This opinion was shared by the Administrat-
ive Court of Frankfurt in its judgment of 
17 December 1963, although the Financial Court 
of Rhineland-Palatinate gave a different rul-
ing (2). 
The Financial Court of Rhineland-Palatinate, 
considering a dispute about levies, referred the 
matter to the Federal Constitutional Court for a 
preliminary ruling and expressed its opinion as 
follows: 
" The EEC Treaty clearly states that the 
legislative capacity of the EEC Council is 
not that of an originator-the function of 
the Executive-but is derived from the 
powers transferred to the Executive. The 
EEC Treaty further states that both the 
EEC Council and the EEC Commission are 
executive authorities. Citizens of the Federal 
(1) See paragraph 31. 
(2) See Judgment of the Administrative Court of Frankfurt of 
17 December 1963 in Aussenwirtschrattsdienst Betriebsbe-
rater, 1964, p. 60. 
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Republic con therefore not regard " regula-
tions " passed by the EEC Council otherwise 
than as regulations passed in compliance 
with the Basic Law. " 
71. Under the Basic Law, ordinances may be 
issued as follows : Article 80 lays down that the 
Federal Government, a Federal Minister or the 
Land Governments may be authorized by a law 
to issue ordinances having the force of law 
(Rechtsverordnungen). But the content, purpose 
and scope of the powers conferred must be set 
forth in the law and the legal basis must be 
stated in the ordinance (1). 
72. In compliance with Article 129 of the Basic 
Law, in so far as legal provisions, which continue 
in force as Federal law, contain an authorization 
to issue ordinances having the force of law or 
general administrative rules, or to perform 
administrative acts, the authorization shall pass 
to the agencies henceforth competent in the 
matter. In cases of doubt, the Federal Govern-
ment shall decide in agreement with the Bundes-
rat. 
73. The Financial Court of Rhineland-Palatinate 
further declared in the reasons it adduced : 
" Whereas the Federation may certainly 
transfer sovereign rights to international 
institutions by passing a law, and according-
ly transfer the right to issue, by means of 
ordinances, judicial regulations binding on 
all concerned throughout the Federation ; 
whereas in doing so, however, it must consid-
er that the Basic Law prohibits any prejudice 
to the principle of the division of compe-
tence; whereas the transfer of sovereign 
rights must not lead to the abrogation from 
without of the division of competence which 
is carefully balanced and safeguarded by the 
Basic Law in order to preserve a free social 
order; 
Whereas the Basic Law is against authoriz-
ing executive institutions to issue regulations 
amending the laws, and whereas the autho-
rization given under the law ratifying the 
EEC Treaty embodies regulations amending 
the laws ... " (2). 
7 4. The Financial Court is here referring to 
Article 20,2 of the Basic Law which stipulates 
that " All State authority emanates from the 
people. It shall be exercised by the people by 
means of elections and voting and by separate 
(1) Decision of the Financial Court of Rhineland-Palatinate at 
Neustadt on 14.11.1963, ref. III/77/63 : Entscheidung der 
Finanz·gerichte elfter Jahrgang 1963 - Heft 9 - Urteil 598, 
p. 444. 
See above, paragraph 34. 
(2) See above, paragraph 70. 
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legislative, executive and judicial organs. " The 
Court also refers to Article 129,3 whereby all 
authorizations to amend or supplement legal 
provisions, or to issue legal provisions instead of 
laws, have expired. 
75. The Financial Court declared that the divi-
sion of competence was the most important 
constitutional principle. 
" Even if it is submitted that the EEC 
Council creates a body of laws rather than 
a series of ordinances, the conclusion 
remains that the law ratifying the Communi-
ty Treaties (1) violates the Basic Law and 
is thence unconstitutional. 
The principle of the division of competence, 
which is essential to ensure the free legal 
order established by the Basic Law, admits 
of exceptions in the Basic Law itself. In the 
sphere of legislation with which we are 
dealing here, the Basic Law allows the 
executive bodies to issue legal provisions 
that have a general binding power. But this 
can only be done if the legislature grants 
the necessary authorization, whose substan-
ce, purpose and scope it must determine, and 
in the form of regulations. The Basic Law 
expressly deprecates any neglect by the 
legislature of its responsibility to enact 
laws, by undue recourse to the delegation of 
authority and allowing the executive bodies 
for example to amend or supplement laws 
by means of ordinances (Rechtsverordnun-
gen) or to issue such ordinances instead of 
laws. 
The authors (of the Basic Law) thus made 
clear their intention as far as possible to 
restrict the legislative power vested in the 
Executive for practical reasons. What is 
more, they prohibited any prejudice to the 
principle of the division of competence. 
There is thus no doubt that the Federal 
legislature would be violating the Basic Law 
if it allowed an executive authority to pro-
mulgate laws. The right of the Federal 
legislature to be a party to international 
organizations finds an insurmountable limi-
tation in the breach of a constitutional 
principle of cardinal importance." 
76. The violation of the Basic Law resulted, in 
the opinion of the Financial Court of Rhineland-
Palatinate, from an infringement of the provi-
sions of Article 79,3 of the Basic Law, whereby 
any amendment to the Law affecting the princip-
les laid down in Articles 1 (" The basic rights 
shall bind the legislature, the executive and the 
(1) See the Law of 27 July 1957 relating. to the treaties of 
25 March 1957 creating the EEC and the EAEC - BGBL II, 
1957, p. 753. 
judiciary as directly enforceable law ") and 20 
("Legislation shall be subject to the constitution-
al order ; the executive and judiciary shaH be 
bound by the law") is deemed inadmissible. 
77. The Financial Court further held that 
constitutional principles also applied to inter-
national treaties and indicated the consequences 
of failure to adhere to these principles : 
" The EEC Treaty does not recognize any 
separation of the legislative from the execut.: 
ive powers. In so far as the law ratifying 
the EEC Treaty authorizes the Council as 
an Executive body to pass laws directly 
enforceable in the Federal Republic, it viol-
ates the Basic Law). That which the authors 
(of the Basic Law) refused to concede to 
the executive of their own country cannot 
be conceded to a supranational executive by 
a legislator who is bound by the Basic Law. 
In the Federal Republic, the exerc;ize of 
State authority is subject to the Basic Law. 
Hence the Basic Law may not be violated 
when international treaties are concluded. 
Lastly, one cannot consider as a general rule 
of public international law either that a 
State should be bound by undertakings stipu-
lated in a treaty where these are at varian-
ce with the principle of the division of 
competence, which is a primary principle 
embodied in the Constitution as a special 
safeguard provision. 
Vesting both legislative and executive 
authority in the EEC Council has, of course, 
not yet seriously affected the legal order of 
the Federal Republic. But the arguments 
advanced to justify the fusion of authority 
to the effect that the transfer of legislative 
power to supranational communities is not 
bound by constitutional limitations, holds out 
the danger that this interpretation may 
some day offer a welcome pretext to the 
forces rejecting the State-at-Law for trans-
ferring executive authority to the executive 
bodies of a supranational Community domin-
ated by authoritarian States and, through 
this ostensibly legal way, overthrow from 
without the national legal order of the 
Federal Republic. " 
18. The Court drew from these arguments the 
conclusion that the powers of the European 
Parliament, at present of little moment, should 
be increased so that there might no longer be 
any constitutional objections to the ratification 
law of 27 July 1957. 
" The Federal Republic will, despite the 
shortcomings of the ratification law, be able 
to fulfil the other obligations to which it 
duly subscribed in the EEC Treaty. To do 
so, it could itself enact, through its constitu-
tional legislative bodies, the necessary 
internal ordinances or, alternatively, induce 
the other Member States to revise the 
Treaty and transform the EEC "Assembly" 
into a genuine parliamentary institution and 
vest it with the right to enact laws that are 
essential to the execution of the Treaty." 
19. On the basis of these considerations, the 
Financial Court of Rhineland-Palatinate decided, 
on 14 November 1963 to refer the case to the 
Federal Constitutional Court and request it 
adjudicate on the compatibility of the law on 
charging levies with the Basic Law, and on the 
compatibility of the law giving effect to EEC 
Regulation 19 of 26 July 1962 on cereals with 
the principle of the division of competence and 
the principle of German law that the citizen 
must be able to understand what is required of 
him under a taxation law. 
80. The Administrative Court of Frankfurt, for 
its part, took a different view (1 ) : 
" The Administrative Court does not agree 
with the opinion of the Financial Court of 
Rhineland-Palatinate that Article 1 of the 
law ratifying the EEC Treaty is unconstitu-
tional because, under Article 189 of the EEC 
Treaty the EEC Council is empowered to 
issue regulations that are, for the Federal 
Republic also, binding in every respect and 
directly applicable. 
The legislator was empowered to transfer 
to the EEC sovereign rights relating to the 
direction and control of the national econo-
my. He was empowered by the Basic Law 
to ratify the EEC Treaty and in particular 
Article 189. Article 24 of the Basic Law 
authorizes the Federation to transfer sover-
eign powers and to consent to limitations of 
sovereignty, the former being further-
reaching in its implications than the latter. 
The cession of sovereign powers through a 
treaty would be conceivable only as a due 
act of deposition, whereby the Federation, 
vested with these powers, once and for all 
transferred its entitlement as a legal sub-
ject to the exercise thereof and was then 
unable either in law or in fact to retract 
from such a transfer or if the Federation, 
remammg as a legal subject vested with 
these powers, transferred the right to their 
exercise, and because the authors of the 
constitution provided for two forms of 
transfer between which it deliberately made 
a distinction, it follows that the author-
ization provided for in Article 24 also 
(1) See above paragraph 70. 
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applies to a permanent cession of sovereign 
powers. 
The EEC Treaty is, according to Article 240, 
" concluded for an unlimited period " and cannot 
be denounced. The legislator thus exercized the 
powers conferred in Article 24,1 of the Basic Law 
when it ratified the EEC Treaty. The Member 
States duly and finally transferred the sovereign 
powers required by the Treaty with respect to 
the direction and control of their national 
economies. 
In Article 24,1, the authors of the Basic 
Law also anticipated constitutional amendments 
implied by the transfer of sovereign powers and 
authorized the legislator to effect such a transfer. 
The EEC exercises the sovereign powers 
transferred to it in its own right over a limited 
area in the same way as a national authority. 
The act of renunciation by the Member States 
did not of course create any new "state" power 
because there is no legal declaration of its 
establishment, provided the State be not consi-
dered solely as a lega;l institution. The act of 
renunciation did, however, allow of its creation 
within precisely that framework where the 
renunciation took place. 
The EEC Council and Commission make the 
EEC law within the framework of Article 189 
of the EEC Treaty. 
The law of ratification is likewise not un-
constitutional because Article 189 provides that 
it is the Council, among the EEC bodies, which 
shall issue regulations. 
It is immaterial, in this connexion, whether 
the authorization in Article 24,1 of the Basic 
Law is limited directly or only in the correspond-
ing application of its provisions, by Article 79,3 
of the Basic Law. It is likewise immaterial 
whether the EEC Council be regarded, among 
the EEC bodies, as an executive body (in the 
sense applicable in the internal theory of the 
division of competence) or if it is primarily a 
legislative body and if its legislation approxi-
mates to what is referred to as, a " simplified " 
legislative procedure which proved its worth in 
Germany prior to the first World War and in the 
period up to 1923. Even if Article 79,3 of the 
Basic Law directly limits the authorization of 
Article 24,1 and even if the EEC Council were 
an executive body, the legislator would not have 
violated Article 79,3, read in conjunction with 
Article 20 of the Basic Law, in passing the law 
of mtification. For international practice almost 
invariably recognizes the legitimacy of the 
transfer of legislative powers to the Executives. 
The German constitutional law recognizes that 
authorizations, limited both as to their purpose 
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and substance, given to the executive, are not 
incompatible with the principles of the division 
of competence and of the State at law. 
We have to agree with the Financial Court 
of Rhineland-Palatinate that the authorization of 
Article 24 of the Basic Law is limited by the 
absolute guarantees of Article 79,3. Thus the 
danger alluded to by that Court, that Article 24 
might one day give a welcome pretext to forces 
rejecting the State at law to transfer the legis-
lative powers to the executive bodies of a supra-
national Community dominated by authoritarian 
States and, in this way, overthrow from without 
the regime of the State at law of the Federal 
Republic, does not arise. This danger can be 
dismissed for another reason : the relevant 
sovereign powers are, by definition, limited by 
the very purpose of the Community ; in other 
words, sovereign rights may only be transferred 
to a body thus endowed with these powers which 
acknowledges the same basic principles as those 
professed by the Federal Republic in its Basic 
Law. The cession of sovereign powers to any 
body unable or unwilling to guarantee fundam-
ental rights to the same extent as the Federation 
would be tantamount to a denial of those basic 
rights ; it would thus be impossible for the 
Federation to do this. Sovereign powers can 
therefore only be transferred to bodies vested 
with powers that recognize fundamental and 
human rights and are ready to protect the free-
dom of the individual, the family and property. 
81. Let us now survey the situation in the other 
countries of the Communities : France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
France 
82. With regard to France, it is of interest to 
consider a judgment delivered by the Council of 
State on 19 June 1964 (1). 
Five companies importing oil (Shell-Berre, 
Garages de France, Esso Standard, Mobiloil, BP) 
appealed to the highest civil court in France to 
annul a decree and an order (arrete) of 3 January 
1959 on the grounds of action ultra vires. These 
texts, which were designed to regulate the obliga-
tions of oil importers and laid down conditions 
for setting up and developing plant for supplying 
oil products, led, in fact, to the plaintiff compa-
nies being deprived of the right to create new 
service stations ; at the same time, in their 
submission, companies importing oil from the 
Sahara-the Total Company in particular-
continued to expand their distribution network. 
(1) See Actualite iuridique, " Droit administratif", Na. 7-8, 
July-August 1964, p. 438 ff. 
83. The plaintiff companies' submission was that 
the ministerial arrete of 3 January 1959 was at 
variance with Articles 3, 7, 30 to 35, 62, 69 et 
sequ., 85, 90, 92 and 96 of the Treaty of Rome. 
Indeed, in their submission, the arrete was 
liable to restrict imports of products from the 
Member States and, consequently, violated a 
whole series of provisions laid down in the above-
mentioned articles. In pursuance of Article 177 
of the EEC Treaty, the plaintiffs therefore called 
upon the Council of State to refer the matter to 
the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties with a view to obtaining a preliminary ruling 
on the interpretation of the relevant articles of 
the Treaty. 
84. They further submitted that the arrete of 
3 January 1959 was incompatible with Article 37 
of the Treaty, in so far as it consolidated the 
monopoly of companies holding special author-
izations to import oil products. This article of 
course provides for the gradual .adjustment of 
any State trading monopolies. 
85. The Council of State, whilst recognizing that 
the European Treaties introduced a new legal 
order, rejected the request to refer the matter to 
the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities. on the following grounds : 
"Whereas Article 177 of the Treaty institu-
ting the European Economic Community 
stipulates that the Court of Justice of the 
European Economic Community shall be 
" competent to give preliminary rulings " 
concerning, in particular, " the interpretation 
of this' treaty " and lays. down for this pur-
pose a reference procedure, from national 
courts to the Court of Justice, it follows 
from the very terms of this Article that a 
national court from whose decisions there 
is no possibility of appeal under domestic 
law, such as the Conseil d'Etat acting in its 
judicial capacity, is only required to stay 
proceedings in a case pending before it and 
to seise the Court of Justice of the EEC if a 
"question" relating to the interpretation of 
the Treaty is "raised" in that case. This 
could only arise where there is uncertainty 
as to the meaning or scope of one or several 
clauses of the Treaty applicable to the main 
action and if the issue of the action depends 
on the settlement of this difficulty. 
Whereas under paragraph 1 of the afore-
mentioned Article 37 : "Member States shall 
gradually adjust any State trading mono-
polies so as to ensure that when the transi-
tional period expires no discrimination exists 
between the nationals of Member States as 
regards the supply or marketing of goods. 
The provisions of this article shall likewise 
apply to any organization through which a 
Member State, de jure or de facto, either 
directly or indirectly controls, supervises or 
appreciably influences imports or exports as 
between Member States. These provisions 
shall likewise apply to monopolies delegated 
by the State to other legal entities "; 
Whereas, on th~one hand, it clearly emerges 
from this clause that its field of application 
includes systems such as that to which 
companies holding special import autho-
rizations, for oil products are subject ; 
Whereas, on the other hand, the same clause 
lays down that any State trading monopolies 
and similar systems should gradually be 
adjusted so as to ensure that when the 
transitional period expires no discrimination 
exists between the nationals of Member 
States, paragraphs 2 to 5 of Article 37 lay 
down the rules which shall obtain during the 
transitional period ; whereas, lastly, sub-
section 6 empowers the EEC Commission to 
make recommendation to the Member States 
as to the manner of effecting the adjustment 
of the State trading monopolies and similar 
systems and the timetable which shall govern 
it, during the transitional period, under a 
special statute which departs from the rules 
of common law laid down in various other 
articles of the Treaty and whose adjustment 
to the said rules must be carried out in grad-
ual stages by the Member States, taking 
account of the recommendations of the EEC 
Commission ; 
Whereas paragraph 2 of Article 37 specifies 
that "Member States shall abstain from 
introducing any new measure which is 
contrary to the principles laid down in pa-
ragraph 1 of this Article or which restricts 
the scope of the Articles dealing with the 
abolition of customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions between Member States; whereas 
it is clear that the purpose of this clause is 
to prohibit any new measure liable to create 
discriminations betweeen nationals of Mem-
ber States or to aggravate existing discri-
minations ; whereas it does not emerge from 
the study of evidence that the arrete appeal-
ed against, which solely concerns' the distri-
bution of oil products and, in particular, the 
creation and installation of service stations 
by French companies holding special import 
authorizations for oil products has the effect 
of creating discrimination between nationals 
of Member States or of aggravating existing 
discriminations ; 
Whereas it emerges from the foregoing that 
the plaintiff companies cannot validly claim 
in support of their subsidiary conclusions 
here analyzed that the arrete . in dispute 
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could conflict either with certain clauses of 
the EEC Treaty relating to the system under 
common law or with the clauses of Article 
37 relating to State trading monopolies or 
monopolies delegated by the State to other 
legal entities ; whereas under these condi-
tions the settlement of the action is not 
subject to any question of interpretation of 
the Treaty ; thr:.t therefore the claim ana· 
lyzed above that the Council of State should 
seise the Court of Justice of the European 
Economic Community cannot be accepted." 
86. This judgment would appear to be subject 
to criticism. The interpretation of the Treaty can 
only be within the competence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities. The 
Council of State alleges that when the rule is 
clear there is no cause to seise the Court for a 
preliminary ruling. This would appear to be a 
dangerous assertion for that which may be clear 
to the French Council of State could also be clear 
to another national court in the Community 
which might, however, interpret it differently 
and the result could only be legal chaos. 
It is essential therefore that the Court of 
Justice of the Communities should have sole 
responsibility for the interpretation of the 
European Treaties. 
Belgium 
87. It has been stated that the Belgian Consti-
tution contains no provisions on where the 
national law stands in relation to international 
treaties (among which the European Treaties 
may be included for purposes of simplification, 
although this is not strictly accurate.) 
88. The Belgian courts have, however, dealt with 
this problem. The Supreme Court of Appeal 
(Court de cassation) decided that an inter-
national treaty approved by the legislative 
assembly and entering into force after an inter-
nal law "arrests the effects of the law (1 ). 
Other courts have rendered similar judg-
ments which demonstrates consistency in this 
jurisprudence. 
89. To date, the question as to whether a law 
should cease to have effect if it is at variance 
with an international treaty concluded prior to 
(1) Supreme Court of Appeal, 8 January 1925 ; dispute as 
between the arr~te-(oi of 10 November 1918 and Article 306 
of the Treaty signed at Versailles on 28 June 1919 and 
approved by the Act of 15 September 1919. 
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it, has not been clarified. All that is certain is 
that in compliance with an equally consistent 
jurisprudence the Belgian courts are not 
empowered to decide as to the constitutionality 
of laws enacted after the entry into force of the 
Constitution. 
90. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that 
in his address on 2 September 1963 at the re-
opening of the Supreme Court of Appeal (Court 
de Cassation) (1), the Attorney-General (Proc-
ureur General) declared that the Treaties institu-
ting the European Communities were designed, 
with respect to certain matters, to substitute for 
the individual interests of the State the common 
interest of the Member States and that it was 
not within the discretion either of the courts or 
of Parliament to pronounce judgment on this 
interest. This contrasts with the thesis defended 
by the French Council of State in maintaining 
that the national courts are empowered to give 
rulings on the basis of the European Treaties 
without first to seise the Court of Justice where, 
in the opinion of the court, the rule is clear. 
Luxembourg 
91. We have already mentioned (2), the judgment 
delivered in 1954 by the Higher Court of Justice 
of the Grand Duchy. In this judgment, it was 
stated that a judge must apply an international 
treaty even if it is incompatible with a law 
subsequently enacted. 
92. In giving the reasons for its decision, the 
Court stated that an international treaty that is 
confirmed by law is a law on a higher level than 
an ordinary law. Such a treaty, therefore, ranks 
above the national law and must always have 
paramountcy over the latter. Luxembourg juris-
prudence is very precise on this point. 
Netherlands 
93. In the Netherlands, as has been seen, there 
can be no doubt as to the absolute paramountcy 
of international or Community law over domestic 
law as a result of amendments to the Constitution 
made in 1953 and 1956 (3). 
In this connexion it is worth mentioning 
that in May 1962, the Court of Justice of the 
Communities was seised of a request under 
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty by the Tarief-
(1) Journal des . tribunaux - 15 September 1963. 
(2) See above, paragraph 51. 
(3) See above, paragraphs 52 to 54. 
commlSSle of Amsterdam, a civil court dealing 
with appeals as a last resort relating to contested 
taxation. In a dispute pending before it, the 
Tariefcommissie sought a preliminary ruling, in 
particular concerning the domestic implications 
of Article 12 of the EEC Treaty. 
Before the Court of Justice, the Dutch and 
Belgian Governments challenged the competence 
of the Court ; their submission was that the point 
at issue was a request relating not to the inter-
pretation but to the application of the Treaty 
within the framework of the constitutional law of 
the Netherlands. More particularly, they submitt-
ed that the Court was not competent to pronounce 
on the pre-eminence to be accorded, if need be, 
to the provisions of the EEC Treaty either in so 
far as Dutch legislation was concerned or as far 
as other agreements passed by the Netherlands 
and incorporated in her national law were 
concerned. 
The Court considered (1) that the Communi-
ty constituted a new legal order in public inter-
national law for whose benefit the States had 
(1) .Recueil de iurisprudence de la Cour, Part. 1. Vol. IX - 1963. 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit in limited 
spheres, and whose subjects were not only the 
Member States but also their nationals. It 
considered that it was not called upon to judge 
of its application according to principles of Dutch 
internal law (which remain the province of the 
national courts) but that it was asked solely to 
interpret the scope of an article in the Treaty 
within the framework of Community law with 
regard to its effect on individuals (which was 
within its competence). 
With regard to the immediate effect of the 
provisions of the Treaty in domestic law, the 
Court recalled that Community law was inde-
pendent of the legislation of the Member States, 
and that it created obligations for individuals 
and was intended to engender rights which came 
within their jurisdiction. The latter sprang not 
only from an express assignment under the 
Treaty but also from obligations imposed quite 
clearly by the Treaty both on individual Member 
States and Community institutions. 
94. In conclusion to the present report, your 
Committee proposes that the following draft 
resolution be adopted : 
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Draft Resolution 
relating to the, paramountcy of Community law over the laws orf the Members Sta,tes 
The European Parliament, 
Aware of its duty to attend to the correct application of the treaties, with 
a view to achieving all their aims and allowing of the gradqal development 
of the Communities ; 
Concerned at the trends that have appeared in the case of certain national 
judicial authorities and which are liable to call into question the actual 
application of the Community provisions ; 
Convinced, however, of the need to respect the independence of the judicial 
authority in the Member States, which constitutes one of the pillars of the 
democratic order ; 
Endorses the conclusions in the report of its Legal Committee (Doc. No. 43) 
signifying support for the principle of the paramountcy of Community law over 
the laws of the Member States : 
Considering that this matter is not yet sufficiently known, even in spheres 
directly concerned, 
Requests its President to circulate this report as widely as possible among 
the responsible national authorities. 
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ANNEXE 
The Bruges coUoquy 
(8, 9 and 10 April 1965,) 
The Colloquy organized in Bruges by the 
College d'Europe bore mainly on " Community 
law and national law. " 
The Rapporteurs we:r.:e : 
Mr. Maurice Lagrange : " La primaute du droit 
communautaire sur le droit national. " 
Mr. Nicola Catalano : " La position du droit com-
munautaire sur le droit national. " 
Mr. Marc Sohier and Mrs. Colette Megret : " Le 
role de l'executif national et du legislateur 
national dans la mise en reuvre du droit 
communautaire. " 
Mr. Fritz MUnch : " Le role des juridictions 
nationales. I. Competences des juridictions 
nationales. " 
Mr. Frederic Dumon : " Le role des juridictions 
nationales. II. Le renvoi prejudiciel (Article 
41 CECA, 117 GEE et 150 CEEA)." 
There were other items on the Colloquy's 
agenda, but that on relationships between Com-
munity law and domestic law attracted the 
greatest attention in the debates. No conclusion 
was reached and no resolution was passed but 
certain main guiding principles may be drawn 
from all the speeches made and views exchanged. 
Those taking part found no difficulty in 
agreeing on the need to ensure the paramountcy 
of Community law over national law in each of 
the Member States, that is to ensure that it was 
in fact applied, notwithstanding any earlier or 
subsequent national regulation at variance with 
it. In this connexion, there was a majority that 
considered the relationship between Community 
and national law as a transfer and hence as a 
sharing of powers rather than as a hierarchy of 
laws. There was, however, no agreement on the 
justification and legal form that might be given 
to this. solution. 
Moreover, the general feeling was that while 
the Treaties of Paris and Rome were not treaties 
" like the others " in regard to their content, they 
had, however, the form of treaties. The domestic 
laws of certain countries (Germany and Italy in 
particular) raised a problem of constitutional 
law that was still unsolved, as some of those 
taking part in the Colloquy were at pains to 
point out. 
With regard to the part that the executive 
and national legislator were to play in implement-
ing Community provisions that were not directly 
enforceable, it was agreed that the legislative 
procedure was hardly fitted for this part ; but 
there were many objections to a solution that 
would consist in entrusting to the national execu-
tive the task of giving effect to Community 
directives. In view of the political options that 
such directives might involve, it was thought 
advisable for some part to be played by the 
parliamentary assemblies while, at the same time, 
endeavouring to find a more efficient procedure. 
In this connexion, several proposals were made 
for endowing the executive power with certain 
legislative responsibilities. 
While discussions on the role of the national 
courts, particularly concerning interlocutory 
applications for rulings, did not give rise to any 
disagreement on the fundamental problems, they 
did reveal the fact th,at such interlocutory applica-
tions for rulings raise a considerable number 
of special issues which are often of capital 
importance from the standpoint of a uniform 
interpretation of Community law. 
The following remarks were made at the 
close of the colloquy by Professor De Vreese, 
who directed the colloquy : 
"When, in some of our countries, constitu-
tional objections are raised against the 
exercise of powers that are materially 
legislative by a Community body that is 
formally executive ; 
when it is seen that the national legislative 
power is reluctant to entrust the execution 
of Community law to a national executive 
authority; 
when our national courts are somewhat non-
plussed when asked to give pre-eminence 
over the national law to a Community regu-
lation emanating from a Community execu-
tive, can this not be traced back in every 
case to the lack-within the Community 
order-of any real democratic control on the 
part of a legislative Assembly ? 
You may perhaps be surprised to find a judge 
venturing into this field. In reality, I am not 
doing so for I know that it is not within our 
discretion to advocate a solution which is prima-
rily political. It is, however, quite within our 
discretion to analyze these difficulties while 
our discretion to analyze these difficulties while 
endeavouring to find the best solution de lege 
lata and to diagnose the reasons underlying such 
difficulties. 
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
1965-1966 Session 
Extract 
from the Minutes of the Session of 22 October 1965 
In the Chair : Mr. Paul J. Kapteyn 
Vice-President 
The paramountcy of Community law 
The President reminded the Parliament that 
it had, at its session in June 1965, held a general 
debate on the report by Mr. Dehousse, submitted 
on behalf of the Legal Committee, on the para-
montcy of Community law over the laws of the 
Member States (Doc. 43). 
order to enable the Legal Committee to examine 
the amendments to the text that had been tabled. 
The Legal Committee had subsequently submit-
ted a supplementary report in conclusion to 
which an amended resolution was proposed. 
The President further recalled that the Par-
liament had decided, at its session of 18 June 
1965, to defer voting on the draft resolution in 
On behalf of the Legal Committee, Mr. Wein-
kamm submitted the supplementary report on 
the paramountcy of Community law over the laws 
of the Member States (Doc. 95). 
Mr. Vermeylen, for the Socialist Group, 
Mr. Santero and Mr. Scelba took the floor. 
In the Chair : Mr. Victor Leemans 
President 
When the debate was resumed Mr. Poher, 
Mr. W einkamm, Rapporteur, Mr. Colonna di Pa-
liano, a member of the EEC Commission, and 
Mr. Scelba took the floor. 
The Parliament adopted the following reso-
lution : 
Resolution 
relating to the paramountcy of Community law over the laws of the Member States 
The European Parliament, 
Aware of its duty to attend to the correct application of the treaties, with 
a view to achieving all their aims and allowing of the gradual development 
of the Communities ; 
Concerned at the trends that have appeared in the case of certain national 
judicial authorities and which are liable to call into question the actual 
application of the Community provisions ; 
Convinced, however, of the need to respect the independence of the judicial 
authority in the Member States, which constitutes one of the pillars of the 
democratic order; 
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Endorses the conclusions of the Report of its Legal Committee (Doc. No 43) 
and affirms the principle and the need to recognize the paramountcy of Commu-
nity law over the laws of the Member States ; 
Considering that this matter is not yet sufficiently known, even in spheres 
directly concerned, trusts that the national governments will publish, under 
the appropriate heading in their official gazettes, the binding measures 
taken by the Communities, whether these be immediately applicable or 
to be applied subsequently - in order to stress their importance, at the 
national level. 
Requests its President to circulate the Report by Mr. Dehousse (Doc. 43) 
and the present resolution as widely as possible among the responsible national 
authorities. 
H.R. NORD, Victor LEEMANS, 
Secretary -General President 
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